CVE-2024-42480 – github.com/clastix/kamaji

Package

Manager: go
Name: github.com/clastix/kamaji
Vulnerable Version: >=0 <=1.0.0

Severity

Level: Critical

CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS: 0.0008 pctl0.24438

Details

RBAC Roles for `etcd` created by Kamaji are not disjunct ### Summary _Using an "open at the top" range definition in RBAC for etcd roles leads to some TCPs API servers being able to read, write and delete the data of other control planes._ ### Details The problematic code is this: https://github.com/clastix/kamaji/blob/8cdc6191242f80d120c46b166e2102d27568225a/internal/datastore/etcd.go#L19-L24 The range created by this RBAC setup code looks like this: ``` etcdctl role get example Role example KV Read: [/example/, \0) KV Write: [/example/, \0) ``` The range end `\0` means "everything that comes after" in etcd, so potentially all the key prefixes of controlplanes with a name that comes after "example" when sorting lexically (e.g. `example1`, `examplf`, all the way to `zzzzzzz` if you will). ### PoC 1. Create two TCP in the same Namespace 2. Scale Kamaji to zero to avoid reconciliations 3. change the Kubernetes API Server `--etcd-prefix` flag value to point to the other TCP datastore key 4. wait it for get it up and running 5. use `kubectl` and will notice you're reading and writing data of another Tenant ### Impact Full control over other TCPs data, if you are able to obtain the name of other TCPs that use the same datastore and are able to obtain the user certificates used by your control plane (or you are able to configure the kube-apiserver Deployment, as shown in the PoC).

Metadata

Created: 2024-08-12T18:22:06Z
Modified: 2024-11-18T16:27:03Z
Source: https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/08/GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5/GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5.json
CWE IDs: ["CWE-284"]
Alternative ID: GHSA-6r4j-4rjc-8vw5
Finding: F039
Auto approve: 1