GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8 – github.com/edgelesssys/contrast

Package

Manager: go
Name: github.com/edgelesssys/contrast
Vulnerable Version: >=0 <1.4.1

Severity

Level: High

CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS: N/A pctlN/A

Details

Contrast's unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation ### Impact Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker. If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either * they `set` a new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of the `contrast` CLI) or * they `verify` the coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference. Under these circumstances, the attacker can: * Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator's root CA. * Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack. This issue does **not** affect the following: * secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA) * integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator * certificates chaining back to the mesh CA ### Patches This issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1. ### Workarounds The issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations. * At the first `set` call, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator. * After subsequent `set` or `verify` calls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.

Metadata

Created: 2025-02-05T21:30:35Z
Modified: 2025-02-06T18:05:15Z
Source: https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/02/GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8/GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8.json
CWE IDs: ["CWE-285"]
Alternative ID: N/A
Finding: F039
Auto approve: 1