GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg – panelsw.custom.wix

Package

Manager: nuget
Name: panelsw.custom.wix
Vulnerable Version: >=0 <3.15.0-a44

Severity

Level: High

CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

EPSS: N/A pctlN/A

Details

Panel::Software Customized WiX .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges # Summary .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. # Details If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the .be/.Local folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges. # PoC As a standard, non-admin user: 1. Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW 1. On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be 1. Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local) 1. Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_.../COMCTL32.dll) 1. Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName. # Impact DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.

Metadata

Created: 2024-02-08T18:24:21Z
Modified: 2024-02-08T18:24:21Z
Source: https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/02/GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg/GHSA-259p-rvjx-ffwg.json
CWE IDs: ["CWE-426"]
Alternative ID: N/A
Finding: F297
Auto approve: 1