Asymmetric denial of service - ReDoS In phpoffice/phpspreadsheet
Description
PhpSpreadsheet has CPU Denial of Service via Unbounded Row Index in SpreadsheetML XML Reader
Summary
The SpreadsheetML XML reader (Reader\Xml) does not validate the ss:Index row attribute against the maximum allowed row count (AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576). An attacker can craft a SpreadsheetML XML file with ss:Index="999999999" on a <Row> element, which inflates the internal cachedHighestRow to ~1 billion. Any subsequent call to getRowIterator() without an explicit end row will attempt to iterate ~1 billion rows, causing CPU exhaustion and denial of service.
Details
In src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xml.php, the loadSpreadsheetFromFile method processes <Row> elements:
// Xml.php:397-402 if (isset($row_ss['Index'])) { $rowID = (int) $row_ss['Index']; // No validation against MAX_ROW } if (isset($row_ss['Hidden'])) { $rowVisible = ((string) $row_ss['Hidden']) !== '1'; $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet()->getRowDimension($rowID)->setVisible($rowVisible); }...
The $rowID value read from ss:Index is cast to int with no upper bound check. It is then passed to getRowDimension():
// Worksheet.php:1342-1351 public function getRowDimension(int $row): RowDimension { if (!isset($this->rowDimensions[$row])) { $this->rowDimensions[$row] = new RowDimension($row); $this->cachedHighestRow = max($this->cachedHighestRow, $row); } return $this->rowDimensions[$row];...
This inflates cachedHighestRow to the attacker-controlled value. Additionally, at line 412, $cellRange = $columnID . $rowID is constructed and passed to getCell(), which calls createNewCell() (Worksheet.php:1294) and also sets cachedHighestRow.
The RowIterator constructor uses getHighestRow() as its default end row:
// RowIterator.php:84-88 public function resetEnd(?int $endRow = null): static { $this->endRow = $endRow ?: $this->subject->getHighestRow(); return $this; }
With cachedHighestRow at ~1 billion, iterating over rows causes CPU exhaustion. The DefaultReadFilter provides no protection — it returns true for all cells.
Even without the Hidden attribute, any cell data within the row still uses the inflated $rowID at line 412, so the ss:Hidden attribute is not required to trigger the vulnerability.
PoC
Create poc.xml:
<?xml version="1.0"?> <?mso-application progid="Excel.Sheet"?> <Workbook xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet" xmlns:ss="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet"> <Worksheet ss:Name="Sheet1"> <Table> <Row ss:Index="999999999" ss:Hidden="1"/> <Row><Cell><Data ss:Type="String">test</Data></Cell></Row>...
Load and iterate:
<?php require 'vendor/autoload.php'; use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory; $reader = IOFactory::createReader('Xml'); $spreadsheet = $reader->load('poc.xml'); $sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet(); ...
Impact
Any PHP application that processes user-uploaded SpreadsheetML XML files using PhpSpreadsheet is vulnerable. An attacker can cause denial of service by:
Exhausting server CPU with a single small XML file (~300 bytes)
Blocking the PHP worker process, potentially affecting all concurrent users
Triggering PHP max_execution_time limits that still consume resources before killing the process
The attack requires no authentication — only the ability to upload or cause the application to process a crafted SpreadsheetML file.
Recommended Fix
Add MAX_ROW validation after reading the ss:Index attribute in src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xml.php:
// After line 398: if (isset($row_ss['Index'])) { $rowID = (int) $row_ss['Index']; if ($rowID > AddressRange::MAX_ROW) { $rowID = AddressRange::MAX_ROW; } }
Add the necessary import at the top of the file:
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Cell\AddressRange;
The same validation should also be applied to the ss:Index attribute on <Cell> elements (line 409) for the column dimension.
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Package | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
packagist | 5.7.0, 3.10.5, 2.4.5, 2.1.16, 1.30.4 |
Aliases
References