Improper resource allocation In brace-expansion
Description
brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups
Summary
brace-expansion's expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2ⁿ) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node's single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.
In expand_, post is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don't use it:
const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : ['']; // always recurses ... if (!isSequence && !isOptions) { if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) { str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post; return expand_(str, max, true); // restart — `post` discarded } return [str];...
For input like a{},{},…, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but expand_ has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away.
Each level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: T(n) = 2·T(n−1) ⇒ O(2ⁿ).
The max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.
Measured on 5.0.6:
groups (n) | input bytes | time |
|---|---|---|
20 | 60 | 130 ms |
24 | 72 | 1.9 s |
26 | 78 | 7.8 s |
30 (PoC) | 90 | ~2 min |
Proof of concept
const { expand } = require('brace-expansion'); // 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes — blocks for minutes: expand('a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}');
Impact
Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.
Remediation
Upgrade to a patched release. The fix:
Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential.
Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.
Verified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n²) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.
If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Component | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
debian 11 | - | ||
debian 12 | - | ||
debian 13 | - | ||
debian 14 | - | ||
rpm rhel8 | - | - | |
rpm rhel8 | 1:22.23.1-2.module+el8.10.0+24556+e9352af2 | ||
rpm rhel9 | 1:22.23.1-2.module+el9.8.0+24538+3f176d52 | ||
rpm rhel10 | 0:3.1.14-2.el10_2 | ||
rpm rhel10 | 1:22.23.1-4.el10_2 | ||
rpm rhel10 | 1:24.18.0-3.el10_2 |
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