Description

motionEye's World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash

Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye

Summary

motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.

Affected Versions

motionEye <= 0.43.1b4

Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies 0600 mode to motion.conf and camera-*.conf files)

Vulnerability Details

World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)

When motionEye writes its configuration, the file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf is created with 644 permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the @admin_password field:

# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Any local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:

$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.

Impact

The exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:

Offline password cracking: The SHA1 hash can be cracked to recover the plaintext admin password

Authentication bypass: When combined with the signature authentication weakness (see GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), the hash can be used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests

Full system compromise: When further chained with CVE-2025-60787 (OS command injection), a local unprivileged user can escalate to the Motion daemon user (often root)

Proof of Concept

The following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin's password:

# Verify the file permissions
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

# Read the hash as an unprivileged user
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password

# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)...
Show more

Verified Output

The following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official motioneye_init method, admin password set to testpassword123):

$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37...
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The hash extracted by the unprivileged testuser matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.

Reproduction Steps

This vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.

Method 1: Manual Installation

Install motionEye on a Linux system:

sudo pip install motioneye
mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye
cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf
sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf

Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765

Verify the config file is world-readable:

ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

As an unprivileged user, read the hash:

sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Method 2: Official motioneye_init Installation

Install motionEye using the official init script:

sudo pip install motioneye
sudo motioneye_init

The motioneye_init script automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765

Verify the config file is still world-readable:

ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

Note that while the ownership changes to motion:motion (instead of root:root in the manual method), the permissions remain 644, meaning any local user can still read the file.

Confirm as an unprivileged user:

sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Both installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.

Related Vulnerabilities

GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3: Password hash accepted as API signing key (CWE-836), which allows the hash exposed by this vulnerability to be used for forging authenticated admin API requests

CVE-2025-60787: OS command injection via image_file_name, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to root

Suggested Remediation

Fix file permissions: Create motion.conf and camera-*.conf with 600 permissions (-rw-------), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)

Timeline

2026-03-11: Vulnerability discovered during security research

2026-03-11: Vendor notified via GitHub Security Advisory

2026-03-12: Vendor acknowledged, confirmed fix in motionEye 0.44.0b1

Mitigation

Aliases

References