Inadequate file size control In com.rabbitmq:amqp-client
Description
RabbitMQ Java client has frame-level OOM: Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0) defeats frame size enforcement
Vulnerability
In AMQConnection.java (line 435-436), after Connection.Tune negotiation, the frame-max limit is set via:
_frameHandler.setFrameMax( Math.min(this.maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax));
When frameMax = 0 (meaning "unlimited" per AMQP spec), Math.min(67108864, 0) = 0. This value is then passed to Utils.framePayloadLimit(0) which returns Integer.MAX_VALUE (line 77-79 of Utils.java):
static int framePayloadLimit(int frameMax) { if (frameMax <= 0) { return Integer.MAX_VALUE; } // ... }
This completely defeats the maxInboundMessageBodySize protection (default 64MB) at the frame level.
Attack Scenario
A malicious AMQP server (or MITM) sends Connection.Tune with frameMax=0:
Client defaults: requestedFrameMax = 0 (ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX, line 82)
negotiatedMaxValue(0, 0) = Math.max(0, 0) = 0 (line 673-676)
Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0) = 0 — 64MB cap defeated
framePayloadLimit(0) = Integer.MAX_VALUE — no frame size enforcement
Attacker sends a single frame with frameSize = 0x1FFFFFFF (~500MB)
Frame.readFrom() (line 135) executes new byte[frameSize] — OOM crash
The frame does not need to be a body frame — method frames, header frames, or heartbeat frames with a crafted size field all trigger the allocation before any content-level check fires.
Root Cause
The AMQP spec uses frameMax=0 to mean "unlimited", but Math.min treats it as the integer value zero. The intent of line 435-436 was to take the smaller of the two limits, but when one limit uses 0-means-unlimited semantics, Math.min always selects the zero, disabling the other limit.
Impact
Default configuration is vulnerable: Both requestedFrameMax (client) and legitimate servers' frameMax in Tune may be 0
Single-frame OOM: One malicious frame triggers up to ~2GB allocation (Integer.MAX_VALUE bytes)
Bypasses existing protection: maxInboundMessageBodySize (introduced to cap allocations at 64MB) is entirely defeated at the frame level
Different from ValueReader OOM: This is a frame-layer allocation in Frame.readFrom(), not a value-layer allocation in ValueReader.readBytes()
Affected Code
AMQConnection.java:435-436 — Math.min with 0-means-unlimited
Utils.java:77-79 — framePayloadLimit(0) returns Integer.MAX_VALUE
Frame.java:135 — new byte[frameSize] allocation site
ConnectionFactory.java:82 — DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX = 0
Suggested Fix
int effectiveFrameMax = (frameMax == 0) ? this.maxInboundMessageBodySize : Math.min(this.maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax); _frameHandler.setFrameMax(effectiveFrameMax);
This treats frameMax=0 as "use maxInboundMessageBodySize as the cap" instead of "zero".
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Component | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
maven | 5.34.0 | ||
debian 13 | - | ||
debian 12 | - |
Aliases
References