Security controls bypass or absence In vm2
Description
VM2 has Missing Error.cause Sanitization that Enables Sandbox Escape to RCE
Affected: vm2 <= 3.11.3
CVSS 3.1: 9.9 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
CWE: CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)
Prerequisite: Embedder exposes a host function that throws an Error with .cause referencing a powerful host object (e.g., process)
Summary
I found that handleException() in lib/setup-sandbox.js recursively sanitizes sub-errors for SuppressedError and AggregateError, but completely ignores the ES2022 Error.cause property. When sandbox code catches a host-thrown error carrying a .cause that references a host object like process, it can traverse that reference to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.
The project's own docs/ATTACKS.md (Defense Invariant #3, line 54) explicitly claims Error.cause is sanitized. The implementation does not match this claim.
Root Cause
The handleException function (lines 869-959 of lib/setup-sandbox.js) walks the prototype chain of caught errors looking for SuppressedError and AggregateError. When it finds them, it recursively sanitizes their contained errors (.error, .suppressed, .errors[]). For all other error types, it returns e directly at line 958 without inspecting .cause.
function handleException(e, visited) { e = ensureThis(e); if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e; // ... cycle detection ... while (proto !== null) { if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) { e.error = handleException(e.error, visited); // sanitized e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited); // sanitized...
Error.cause was introduced in ES2022 (Node 16.9+). When handleException was extended to cover SuppressedError (for ES2024 using declarations) and AggregateError, the .cause property was simply overlooked.
Affected Code
lib/setup-sandbox.js:869-959, the handleException function (missing .cause handling)
lib/setup-sandbox.js:886, ensureThis wraps the error but does not recurse into .cause
docs/ATTACKS.md:54, Defense Invariant #3 falsely claims .cause is covered
Reproduction
Embedder code that exposes a function throwing with .cause set to process:
const { VM } = require('vm2'); const vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostFn: () => { throw new Error('fail', { cause: process }); } }...
Verified output:
uid=502(vladimir.tokarev) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),...
Full RCE confirmed.
Impact
Any application using vm2 where an embedder-exposed function throws an Error with .cause referencing a host object is vulnerable. The attacker gains:
Full host process access (read/write files, spawn processes, network access)
Sandbox escape with changed scope (CVSS S:C)
No user interaction required
The prerequisite (embedder throwing with .cause) is increasingly common. Error chaining via new Error('msg', { cause: originalError }) is standard practice in modern Node.js code. Library wrappers, database adapters, and HTTP clients routinely chain errors this way.
Suggested Fix
Add .cause sanitization before the prototype-chain walk, so it applies to all error types:
function handleException(e, visited) { e = ensureThis(e); if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e; if (!visited) visited = new LocalWeakMap(); if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e; apply(localWeakMapSet, visited, [e, true]); // Sanitize .cause on ALL errors (ES2022)...
docs/ATTACKS.md Defense Invariant #3 should also be updated to reflect reality until this fix ships.
Artifacts
File | Role |
|---|---|
poc_error_cause_escape.js | PoC demonstrating sandbox escape to RCE via unsanitized .cause |
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Component | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
npm | 3.11.6 |
Aliases
References