Business information leak In open-webui
Description
Open WebUI vulnerable to Global Knowledge Base Enumeration via knowledge-bases Meta-Collection
Global Knowledge Base Enumeration via knowledge-bases Meta-Collection
Affected Component
Retrieval collection access validation:
backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py (lines 2330-2355, _validate_collection_access)
backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py (query endpoints, e.g. POST /query/doc)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the knowledge base subsystem.
Description
The _validate_collection_access function uses an incomplete allowlist that only enforces ownership checks for collections matching user-memory-* and file-* patterns. All other collection names pass through unchecked — including the system-level knowledge-bases meta-collection, which stores the IDs, names, and descriptions of every knowledge base on the instance.
Any authenticated user can query this meta-collection directly via the retrieval query endpoints to obtain a global index of all knowledge bases across all users.
# retrieval.py:2330-2355 — incomplete collection allowlist def _validate_collection_access(user, collection_name, ...): if collection_name.startswith('user-memory-'): # Check user-memory ownership ... elif collection_name.startswith('file-'): # Check file access ......
This finding is the enabler for the KB destruction (process/web), KB content injection (process/file), and RAG vector search access bypass findings — all of which require knowing a target KB's UUID. Without this enumeration, UUIDs are random and practically unguessable; with it, UUIDs across the entire instance are trivially obtained.
CVSS 3.1 Breakdown
Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API call |
Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single API call |
Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires any authenticated user account |
User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |
Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the knowledge base boundary |
Confidentiality | Low (L) | Discloses KB metadata (IDs, names, descriptions) across all users |
Integrity | None (N) | No direct data modification |
Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |
Attack Scenario
Attacker (any authenticated user) sends:
POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/doc { "collection_name": "knowledge-bases", "query": "confidential" }
_validate_collection_access does not recognize the knowledge-bases prefix and lets the request pass.
The vector search returns the most relevant documents from the meta-collection — knowledge base records including their UUIDs, names, and descriptions — across all users on the instance.
Attacker varies the query to enumerate more KBs: "project", "internal", "private", etc.
Attacker now has a full target list for subsequent attacks (destruction, poisoning, content extraction).
Impact
Information disclosure: KB names and descriptions may reveal sensitive project names, internal initiatives, or user activities
Enabler for other attacks: Unlocks the following findings by supplying the required target UUIDs:
KB destruction/poisoning via process/web
Cross-user content injection via process/file
RAG vector search access bypass in retrieval/utils.py
Transforms these from theoretical (requires UUID guessing) to trivially exploitable (UUIDs enumerable)
Preconditions
Attacker must have a valid user account
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Package | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
pypi | open-webui | 0.9.0 |
Aliases
References