Insecure generation of random numbers In github.com/gofiber/utils/v2
Description
Fiber Utils UUIDv4 and UUID Silent Fallback to Predictable Values
Summary
Critical security vulnerabilities exist in both the UUIDv4() and UUID() functions of the github.com/gofiber/utils package. When the system's cryptographic random number generator (crypto/rand) fails, both functions silently fall back to returning predictable UUID values, the zero UUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000". This compromises the security of all Fiber applications using these functions for security-critical operations on Go versions prior to 1.24.
Both functions are vulnerable to the same root cause (crypto/rand failure):
UUIDv4(): Indirect vulnerability through uuid.NewRandom() → crypto/rand.Read() → fallback to UUID()
UUID(): Direct vulnerability through crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]) → silent zero UUID return
Note: Go 1.24 and later panics on
crypto/randRead()failures, mitigating this vulnerability. Applications running on Go 1.24+ are not affected by the silent fallback behavior.
Vulnerability Details
Affected Functions
Package: github.com/gofiber/utils
Functions: UUIDv4() and UUID()
Return Type: string (both functions)
Locations: common.go:93-99 (UUIDv4), common.go:60-89 (UUID)
Technical Description
The vulnerability occurs through two related but distinct failure paths, both ultimately caused by crypto/rand.Read() failures on Go < 1.24:
Primary Path: UUIDv4() Vulnerability
UUIDv4() calls google/uuid.NewRandom() which internally uses crypto/rand.Read()
If uuid.NewRandom() fails, UUIDv4() falls back to the internal UUID() function
No error is returned to the application - silent security failure occurs
Secondary Path: UUID() Vulnerability
UUID() directly calls crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]) to seed its internal state
If seeding fails, UUID() silently fails and returns the zero UUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
Applications receive predictable UUIDs with no indication of the security failure
Code Analysis
UUIDv4() Vulnerability Path
func UUIDv4() string { token, err := uuid.NewRandom() // Uses crypto/rand.Read() internally if err != nil { return UUID() // Dangerous fallback - no error returned to application } return token.String() }
UUID() Vulnerability Path
func UUID() string { uuidSetup.Do(func() { if _, err := rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]); err != nil { // Direct crypto/rand.Read() call return // Silent failure - no seeding, uuidCounter remains 0 } uuidCounter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(uuidSeed[:8]) }) if atomic.LoadUint64(&uuidCounter) <= 0 {...
Root Cause: Both vulnerabilities stem from crypto/rand.Read() failures, occurring through different code paths with the same dangerous silent fallback behavior.
Security Impact
Severity: CRITICAL
This issue is especially severe because many Fiber middleware packages (session, CSRF, auth, rate-limit, request-ID, etc.) default to utils.UUIDv4() for generating security-sensitive identifiers. A failure in crypto/rand would cause every generated identifier across the entire application to collapse to a single predictable value (the zero UUID), resulting in:
Session fixation / universal session hijack
CSRF token predictability and bypass
Authentication token replay
Global identifier collisions leading to severe application breakage
Potential application-wide DoS due to every request using the same “unique” key, causing cache overwrites, session stomping, corrupted internal maps, and loss of isolation across all users
Attack Scenario
While entropy exhaustion is extremely rare on modern Linux systems, RNG access failures (e.g., restricted /dev/random or /dev/urandom access, broken container environments, sandbox restrictions, misconfigured VMs, or FIPS-mode RNG failures) are realistic. In these scenarios on Go < 1.24, crypto/rand may return errors immediately — triggering the vulnerable fallback paths.
On Go 1.24+, crypto/rand Read() panics on failure, mitigating the silent-zero fallback issue.
Proof of Concept
uuid.NewRandom() fails (indirect crypto/rand.Read() failure)
UUIDv4() calls UUID() as fallback with no error returned
UUID() seeding fails directly via crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:])
Zero UUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" is returned silently
No error is propagated to the application from either function
Affected Versions
All versions of github.com/gofiber/utils containing the UUIDv4() or UUID() functions
Applications using Fiber middleware that depend on UUIDv4() or UUID for security
Only applicable to Go < 1.24; Go 1.24+ panics/block on crypto/rand Read() failures and is not affected
Mitigation
Immediate Workaround
Replace usage of utils.UUIDv4() with uuid.New() or wait for fix:
sessionID := uuid.New()
Recommended Fix
Modify utils.UUIDv4() and utils.UUID() to fail explicitly when cryptographic randomness is unavailable:
func UUIDv4() string { token, err := uuid.NewRandom() if err != nil { panic(fmt.Sprintf("utils: failed to generate secure UUID: %v", err)) } return token.String() } ...
Detection
Applications can detect if they're affected by:
Checking if they use github.com/gofiber/utils
Searching for UUIDv4() and UUID() usage in security-critical code paths
Reviewing Fiber middleware configurations that rely on defaults of UUIDv4() for security identifiers
References
Package Repository: https://github.com/gofiber/utils
Fiber Framework: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber
Google UUID Library: https://github.com/google/uuid
Golang crypto/rand behavior changes: golang/go#66821, Go 1.25.5 source
Contact
Reported by: @sixcolors
Classification
OWASP: A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
Impact: Complete compromise of application security model on Go < 1.24
Exploitability: Medium (requires entropy failure)
Scope: All Fiber applications using affected middleware on Go < 1.24
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Component | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
go | 2.0.0-rc.4 | ||
go | 1.2.0 |
Aliases
References