Description

NocoDB: Refresh Token Cookie Set Without secure and sameSite Flags

Summary

The refresh-token cookie was set with httpOnly: true but missing both the secure flag and the sameSite attribute. Over plain HTTP the cookie could be intercepted on the network; without sameSite, browsers attached it to cross-site POSTs, enabling CSRF against the token-refresh endpoint.

Details

In packages/nocodb/src/services/users/helpers.ts, setTokenCookie produced the cookie with only httpOnly, an expires date, and an optional domain from NC_BASE_HOST_NAME — no secure, no sameSite. The refresh endpoint POST /api/v2/auth/token/refresh (auth.controller.ts) read the cookie unconditionally and returned a new JWT, with no CSRF token.

The fix sets httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax', and conditional secure: req.ncSiteUrl.startsWith('https') so the flag is active under HTTPS while still functional on plain-HTTP localhost development.

This is distinct from GHSA-x4vh-j75g-268g (refresh-token lifecycle on password reset) — different root cause, different attack vector.

Impact

Cookie interception on plain HTTP networks (no secure).

Cross-site refresh: malicious cross-origin pages could trigger token refresh and, combined with any same-origin XSS or open-redirect on the NocoDB domain, capture the new JWT.

Refresh tokens have multi-day expiry (NC_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXP_IN_DAYS), so the exposure window is long.

Credit

This issue was reported by @ik0z.

Mitigation

Aliases

References