Reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) In wwbn/avideo
Description
Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via innerHTML in AVideo
Summary
AVideo contains a reflected XSS vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser. User input from a URL parameter flows through PHP's json_encode() into a JavaScript function that renders it via innerHTML, bypassing encoding and achieving full script execution.
Root Cause
The vulnerability is caused by two issues working together:
1. Source: Unescaped user input passed to JavaScript (videoNotFound.php)
File: view/videoNotFound.php line 49
if (!empty($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'])) { echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg']) . ');'; }
PHP's json_encode() with default flags only escapes quotes (" → \") and backslashes. It does NOT escape HTML special characters (<, >, /). The resulting string contains raw HTML tags that are passed directly to JavaScript.
2. Sink: innerHTML renders HTML tags as executable DOM (script.js)
File: view/js/script.js
function avideoAlertInfo(msg) { // line ~1891 avideoAlert("", msg, 'info'); // calls ↓ } function avideoAlert(title, msg, type) { // line ~1270 avideoAlertHTMLText(title, msg, type); // calls ↓ } ...
innerHTML parses the string as HTML. Any <img>, <svg>, or other HTML tags with event handlers are instantiated as real DOM elements, triggering JavaScript execution.
Data Flow
URL parameter (?404ErrorMsg=PAYLOAD) → $_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'] → json_encode() ← does NOT escape < > / → avideoAlertInfo() → avideoAlert() → avideoAlertHTMLText() → span.innerHTML = msg ← renders HTML tags, executes JS
Proof of Concept
https://localhost/view/videoNotFound.php?404ErrorMsg=<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
The page renders:
avideoAlertInfo("<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>");
Which flows to span.innerHTML = "<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>". The browser creates an <img> element, src=x fails to load, onerror fires alert(document.domain).
Affected Code
File | Line | Issue |
|---|---|---|
view/videoNotFound.php | 49 | json_encode() does not escape < > for HTML context |
view/js/script.js | 1464 | span.innerHTML = msg renders user input as HTML |
view/js/script.js | 1282 | span.innerHTML = msg in avideoAlertWithCookie() |
view/js/script.js | 1335 | span.innerHTML = __(msg,true) in avideoConfirm() |
view/js/script.js | 1358 | span.innerHTML = msg in avideoAlertOnceForceConfirm() |
The innerHTML sink exists in 4 functions. Any future code that passes user input to avideoAlertInfo(), avideoAlertWarning(), avideoAlertDanger(), or avideoAlertSuccess() will create additional XSS vectors.
Remediation
Fix 1: Escape HTML in PHP (source fix)
// view/videoNotFound.php line 49 // BEFORE (vulnerable): echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg']) . ');'; // AFTER (fixed): echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'], JSON_HEX_TAG | JSON_HEX_AMP) . ');';
JSON_HEX_TAG converts < → \u003C and > → \u003E, preventing HTML injection.
Fix 2: Use textContent instead of innerHTML (sink fix, recommended)
// view/js/script.js - all alert functions // BEFORE (vulnerable): span.innerHTML = msg; // AFTER (fixed): span.textContent = msg;
textContent treats the string as plain text — HTML tags are displayed literally, never parsed or executed.
Fix 3: Add Content-Security-Policy header (defense in depth)
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
Impact
Session hijacking — steal PHPSESSID cookie (not HttpOnly by default)
Account takeover — use stolen session to change password or email
Phishing — inject a realistic login form inside the SweetAlert modal
Worm propagation — inject self-spreading payloads via comments/messages
Admin compromise — send crafted link to admin, steal session, gain full control
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Component | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
packagist | 26.0 |
Aliases
References