Authentication mechanism absence or evasion In openssl-encrypt

Description

openssl-encrypt has CORS wildcard with allow_credentials=True in standalone servers

Summary

Both standalone servers configure CORS with allow_origins=["*"], allow_credentials=True, allow_methods=["*"], and allow_headers=["*"].

Affected Code

# server/telemetry-server/app/main.py:23-29
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=settings.cors_origins,  # defaults to ["*"]
    allow_credentials=True,
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)...

The docker-compose file (openssl_encrypt_server/docker-compose.yml:75) also defaults CORS_ORIGINS to *, and .env.example ships with CORS_ORIGINS=*.

Impact

This is the most permissive CORS configuration possible, allowing any website to make fully credentialed cross-origin requests to the API. An attacker's website could make authenticated API calls on behalf of any user who visits it.

Recommended Fix

    Remove wildcard defaults — require explicit origin configuration

    Never combine allow_origins=["*"] with allow_credentials=True

    Update .env.example with placeholder domains instead of *

Fix

Fixed in commit 809416b on branch releases/1.4.x — changed CORS default from ["*"] to [] in both key-server and telemetry-server; added validation rejecting wildcard when debug=False.

Mitigation

Update Impact

Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.

Ecosystem
Package
Affected version
Patched versions