Lack of data validation In github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
Description
Gotenberg's ExifTool group-prefix syntax bypasses dangerous-tag blocklist Summary
The ExifTool metadata write blocklist in Gotenberg v8 can be bypassed using ExifTool's group-prefix syntax, enabling arbitrary file rename, move, hardlink, and symlink creation on the server. This is a bypass of the fix for GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m.
Details
The blocklist in pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go filters four dangerous pseudo-tags (FileName, Directory, HardLink, SymLink) using strings.EqualFold(key, tag). However, ExifTool supports group-prefix syntax where File:FileName is processed identically to FileName -- the prefix is stripped by SetNewValue in Writer.pl before tag matching.
The safeKeyPattern regex (^[a-zA-Z0-9\-_.:]+$) allows colons, so prefixed tag names pass validation. Any prefix works: File:FileName, System:Directory, a:HardLink, etc.
Additionally, FilePermissions, FileUserID, and FileGroupID pseudo-tags are not blocked at all and can modify file attributes without any prefix.
PoC
# Rename the converted PDF (bypasses FileName blocklist) curl -F "[email protected]" \ -F 'metadata={"File:FileName":"pwned.pdf"}' \ http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write # Move the file to /tmp (bypasses Directory blocklist) curl -F "[email protected]" \ -F 'metadata={"File:Directory":"/tmp"}' \...
Impact
Pre-auth (no authentication by default). Attacker can rename, move, or create links to files within the Gotenberg container. In deployments with mounted volumes or non-containerized setups, this enables arbitrary file read via symlink chaining and file overwrite via directory manipulation.
This is a direct bypass of the fix for GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m.
Mitigation
Update Impact
Minimal update. May introduce new vulnerabilities or breaking changes.
Ecosystem | Package | Affected version | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|
go | 8.30.0 |
Aliases
References